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Introduction
The IS/LM-AD/AS-model is still the standard framework for teaching undergraduate macroeconomics. However, it gets more and more criticized for several aspects.
cluding a time preference rate of the monetary authority equal to the long-run interest rate, the standard Taylor rule is stable in the presence of a cost-push shock.
The central bank thus does not have an incentive to deviate from the announced rule and to switch over to the inconsistent policy regime. However, there exists a multiplicity of stable Taylor rules which are superior to the standard one. In contrast to the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach, implementing a monetary rule such that the cost and benefit resulting from inconsistent policy coincide -which implies a net gain of inconsistent policy behavior equal to zero -is not optimal. Instead, the solution can be enhanced by moving into the time-consistent area where the net gain of inconsistent monetary policy is negative. Moreover and in contrast to Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) , there exists no stable monetary policy rule maximizing the welfare. The stable area furthermore becomes larger when assuming an additional term in the social loss function concerning interest rate stability. This implies that the reputation of the central bank naturally improves if the policy maker is also concerned about stabilizing the interest rate. Our results remain robust with respect to the analysis of simultaneous supply and demand shocks.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 shortly describes the applied model. In Section 3, we turn to monetary policy issues including the optimal discretionary monetary policy, simple Taylor rules, and the incentive to deviate from the announced policy rule. We moreover derive the continuum of time-consistent Taylor rules, discuss the problem of finding an optimal stable rule, and check our results for robustness. The last section concludes.
The Model
Following Bofinger, Meyer, and Wollmershäuser (2006) , we apply a static approximation of the microfounded canonical New Keynesian model. The model can be represented by a three-dimensional equation system including an IS curve, a Phillips curve, and a monetary policy rule. The IS curve is given by
where x denotes the output gap which is defined as the deviation of output from its efficient level. a is a constant. b represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. r is the real interest rate and ε 1 denotes a demand shock. As shown in the Appendix, the demand shock can also be interpreted as a shock to aggregate technology or innovation.
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The second building block of the model is the static approximation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve
where π and π e represent current and expected future inflation, respectively. δ is the slope of the Phillips curve. ε 2 represents a cost-push shock.
In contrast to the demand shock, the supply shock causes a trade-off for the monetary authority between stabilizing output and inflation. Therefore, we will restrict our analysis to cost-push shocks. However, we will re-consider the demand shock for a robustness check at the end of our analysis.
Monetary Policy
In the following we will discuss different types of policy regimes, namely the optimal discretionary monetary policy, D, the commitment regimeà la Taylor, T R, and the regime under inconsistent policy, IP . Independently of the assumed type of monetary policy, the central bank seeks to minimize a social loss function.
As shown by Galí (2008, Chapter 4) and Woodford (2003, Chapter 6) , the second order approximation of the households' utility function delivers a quadratic loss function which represents flexible inflation targeting in the spirit of Svensson (1999) . The static approximation of this function is given by
where π T represents the target inflation rate and λ ∈ [0, 1] is the central bank's preference parameter on stabilizing the output gap as in Wollmershäuser (2006, 2009) . In the case λ = 0, the central bank's preferences represent a strict inflation targeting regime, i.e. the monetary authority is just concerned about stabilizing inflation.
Following Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) , we additionally assume that the monetary authority's target of the output gap is positive, i.e. x T > 0. 6 An economic rationale is that e.g. monopolistic distortions or taxes keep potential output below its efficient level [see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) ]. Then the social loss is given by
The discretionary monetary policy regime
In this section, we will derive the optimal discretionary monetary policy. In this regime, the expected inflation rate is taken as given for the central bank since the monetary authority applies a sequential optimization. Therefore, it is unable to make credible announcements concerning the design of monetary policy that could influence private expectations.
The central bank minimizes the social loss (4) subjected to the Phillips curve (2). 7 Inserting the Phillips curve (2) in the social loss function (4) and optimizing the resulting equation with respect to the output gap yields the following first order condition:
Following Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) , we assume that private expectations about inflation are formed before the shocks occur. This implies that when forming expectations about inflation, the shocks (ε 1 and ε 2 ) are not included in the information 6 An alternative approach to include the problem of time-inconsistency into the model would be to assume an asymmetric loss function [see Cukiermann and Gerlach (2003) , Nobay and Peel (2003), or Ruge-Murcia (2003) ]. However, there is no micro-foundation for such a loss function at all. We moreover want to remain as close as possible to the Barro and Gordon approach. In addition, there is empirical evidence for both approaches [see e.g. Ireland (1999) and Gerlach (2003) ]. 7 Note that the IS curve is not a binding restriction in this case.
set of private agents [see also Walsh (2003) , Ch. 8].
Inserting (5) in the Phillips curve and taking rational expectations conditional on the set of private information, I, with E[ε 2 |I] = 0, yields the expected inflation rate under discretionary monetary policy.
Note that in the case of a flexible inflation targeting regime implying λ > 0, expected inflation is above the central bank's target level when the monetary authority aims for a positive output gap.
Combining (5) and (6) yields the solution path of the output gap.
The solution of the output gap is independent of the corresponding target level, x T , and moreover coincides with the discretionary solution in the case where the central bank does not target a positive output gap, i.e. x| Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) ].
However, this does not hold for the solution of inflation. By inserting (6) and (7) in the Phillips curve, we obtain
The central bank's target level of the output gap represents an additional term [or:
inflation bias] in the solution of inflation which pushes inflation above its target level.
Since under rational expectations the model structure including the loss function is known by private agents, the intention of the central bank to push the output gap above its natural level fails. Instead, the solution of output remains unchanged and that of inflation is 'biased'.
This result also holds in the absence of a supply shock, i.e. ε 2 = 0. Moreover, equation (8) implies that inflation only coincides with its target level when the central bank's preferences represent strict inflation targeting (λ = 0). This is a very intuitive result since in this case, the central bank is not concerned about the output gap at all.
When combining (7) and (8), discretionary monetary policy can be expressed as a targeting rule [see Svensson (1999) ] given by
implying a negative relationship between the stabilization of inflation and the output gap at the respective target level.
Finally, the social loss under discretionary monetary policy can be derived by inserting the solutions of the output gap (7) and inflation (8) in the welfare function (4).
If a cost-push shock is existent, i.e. ε 2 = 0, the loss is strictly positive as long as
Simple rule
In this section, we will derive the social loss when the central bank credibly commits itself to follow a simple monetary policy rule of Taylor-type and thus influences private expectations.
The Taylor rule is commonly represented as
where k x and k π are the elasticities of the nominal interest rate, i, with respect to the deviation of the output gap and the inflation rate from their respective target level. In the following, we will refer to them as Taylor rule coefficients. The real interest rate which is the argument of the IS curve (1) is then obtained from the nominal interest rate via the well-known Fisher equation.
Note that the following condition is necessary to ensure that the dynamic counterpart of our model has a unique and stable equilibrium [see Bullard and Mitra (2002) or Walsh (2003) , Chap. 5]
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor of private households. The stability of the whole system thus crucially depends on the Taylor rule coefficients. In the following, we will assume that the Taylor principle, k π > 1, and the condition k x > 0 hold.
Then the stability condition (12) is obviously satisfied.
i T is the central bank's target level of the nominal interest rate which follows
The corresponding target level of the real interest rate, r T , follows from the IS equation and is given by
Note that the target level of the real interest rate coincides with its natural level,
Inserting the Taylor rule (11) with (13) and (14) in the IS curve (1), yields
By plugging this expression into the Phillips curve (2) and taking rational expectations, we obtain the expected inflation rate under the monetary policy regime When combining (16) and the Phillips curve (2), we obtain the solution path of the output gap and the inflation rate
where α ≡ 1 + b(k x + δk π ). Equivalently to the case of the discretionary monetary policy, the solution of the output gap is independent of its target level. Hence, equation (17) In order to obtain the social loss under the policy regime T R for arbitrary coefficients k π and k x , we finally insert the solutions of the output gap and inflation in the welfare function (4).
From (19) it directly follows that the social loss approaches infinity, if k π tends to unity. In this limit case the social loss exceeds that under discretionary monetary policy (10). The rationale is the reaction of expected inflation which according to (16) also tends to infinity, if k π → 1.
The following numerical example however shows that when applying a standard calibration, the social loss under discretionary monetary policy clearly exceeds that under T R. The Taylor rule regime is then preferable. As standard in the New Keynesian literature, we assume the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, b, to be equal to one. Under commonly chosen deep parameters, the slope of the Phillips curve is 0.0858 implying an average price duration of four quarters and an annual nominal interest rate of about 4%. Following Svensson (1999) , we set the flexible inflation targeting parameter λ to 0.5. We arbitrarily assume the target level of the output gap to be 0.1 implying that the potential output level is 10% higher than the current one. The shock impact is normalized to one. D, when the Taylor rule coefficient k π tends to unity. However, if k π is sufficiently larger than one and k x is sufficiently larger than zero, V | T R is preferable to V | D .
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In the case of standard Taylor rule, i.e. k π = 1.5 and k x = 0.5, the social loss in the regime T R is significantly lower than in the discretionary case. The numerical
The credible commitment to the standard monetary policy rule yields a significant welfare gain via the expectation channel which is not active in the discretionary case.
10 The social loss under D exceeds that under T P by about 24%.
Inconsistent Policy
In this section, we will show that the central bank has an incentive to deviate from the announced Taylor rule if the monetary authority is faced with a purely static one-period optimization approach.
If the central bank credibly announces to follow a specifically calibrated Taylor rule, expected inflation is tied at a given level according to (16). However, the central bank can then achieve a welfare gain by re-optimizing in a discretionary manner. In this case, the monetary authority will not implement the announced policy rule. We will refer to this policy regime as inconsistent monetary policy, IP .
The maximization problem under IP is given by
As in the discretionary case, the first order condition with respect to the output gap is given by
Equation (22) By inserting (16) in (22), we obtain the solution of the output gap under the inconsistent policy regime, IP .
Again, the solution of inflation is then obtained via the Phillips curve (2).
In contrast to the purely discretionary monetary policy and the regime under commitment to a Taylor rule, the solution of the output gap (23) now depends on its target level. This implies that the central bank's intention to push output above its natural level can now be achieved. However and in line with our previous finding under discretionary monetary policy, inflation only coincides with its target level when the central bank follows strict inflation targeting.
The combination of (23) and (24) yields the same targeting rule as in the discretionary case [cf. (9)]:
The social loss under inconsistent monetary policy can finally be obtained by
inserting (23) and (24) in (4).
By definition, V | T R must exceed V | IP , i.e. the deviation from the announced Taylor rule yields a welfare enhancement. The numerical evaluation for the two policy regimes under the standard parameterizations delivers
The welfare gain resulting from the inconsistent policy regime when announcing a standard Taylor rule is thus about 19%.
Time-Consistent Simple Rules
In this section, we will derive a continuum of time-consistent (or: stable) simple rules. This is done by assuming a long-run planning horizon of the monetary authority as in Barro and Gordon (1983a,b In this frameworkà la Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) , the central bank is faced with a simple cost-benefit calculation where the benefit, B, is the welfare gain 
Equation (28) implies that there exists a subjective time preference rate, z, such that the net gain is zero. In this case, the monetary authority is indifferent between switching over to IP and executing the announced rule. This critical time preference rate, z * , is given by
11 Alternatively, one can analyze the case where the central bank looses its reputation for all times when deviating once. However, the qualitative results remain unchanged. 12 By assuming that the central bank looses its reputation for all times when deviating once from the announcement, the total gain resulting from IP would be given by
A central bank with a rate of time preference larger than z * , i.e. a monetary authority whose planning horizon is rather short, consequently expects N > 0.
Correspondingly, a more long-run oriented central bank, z < z * , expects N < 0, i.e. it would not switch over to the regime IP .
In our numerical example, the critical time preference rate z * is 0.4903. The corresponding discount factor, 1/(1 + z * ), is then about 0.67 implying a central bank whose planning horizon is rather short. In the monetary economics literature, a basic assumption is that the subjective preference rate coincides with the longrun real interest rate. 13 The latter is typically chosen to be equal to 4% which is clearly below the critical subjective rate of time preference. Hence, such a central bank is farsighted and does not yield a net gain from inconsistent monetary policy.
Assuming z = 0.04, the standard Taylor rule is stable. consequently delivers the specific k π /k x -combinations which result in N = 0. This 13 As already mentioned, the social loss function (3) can be derived by a second order approximation of the household's utility function. Hence, the discount factors of the central bank and the households must coincide. Further note that when assuming a zero-inflation steady state, the real interest rate is equal to its nominal counterpart in the long-run.
implies that the k π /k x -combinations within the white area on the right-hand side of Figure 2 deliver N < 0 since the cost exceeds the benefit of inconsistent policy.
These rules are consequently time-consistent. 14 The limit case N = 0 just holds for the boundary of this area. It can moreover be observed from Figure 2 that a Taylor rule with k x = 0 is never stable given our assumptions.
As in Barro and Gordon (1983a) , there exists a continuum of reputational equilibria where the central bank has no incentive to deviate from the announced monetary policy. The monetary authority will consequently not switch over to inconsistent policy. Announcing such a rule is necessarily credible. The next step is to find an optimal stable interest rate rule.
Since the policy maker follows a Taylor rule -satisfying the Taylor principle and k x > 0 -the monetary authority has to control for two parameters, k π and k x . In contrast to the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach where the central bank can directly control the inflation rate, the optimal stable policy must now be determined in a three-dimensional space. Moreover, the optimal choice in Barro and Gordon (1983a) is a point in the intersection of the function B and C since it minimizes the social loss. In our approach, the social loss resulting from the k π /k x -combinations implying N = 0 can however be improved when moving into the stable area. For illustrating this issue, we will fix one Taylor coefficient for the moment in order to obtain a two-dimensional decision problem. Figure 3 illustrates the corresponding partial social loss function under T R (dashed lines) and the net gain from the deviation from the announced rule (solid lines) when holding the Taylor rule coefficient on the output gap constant. 15 The figure indicates that under constant k x there always exists a coefficient on inflation such that the resulting social loss is optimal. These (restricted) optima are denoted with a black dot. Moreover, Figure 3 shows that the k π /k x -combinations which result in N = 0 can be enhanced as they do not yield an optimal loss for given k x .
For instance, the combination k x = 0.5 and k π = 1.35 yields N = 0. However, this combination of Taylor rule coefficients is not optimal as the social loss declines when increasing the Taylor rule coefficient on inflation up to 1.8. This combination is within the stable area which is a general result as all (restricted) optima are within the stable area and not in the intersection of B and C. By contrast, the optimal policy choice in Barro and Gordon (1983a) is in the intersection of cost and benefit resulting from inconsistent monetary policy. Furthermore, Figure 3 indicates that the larger the Taylor rule coefficient, k x , the larger is the second one, k π , in the optimum. This result also holds vice versa when k π is constant. x , when respectively taking k x and k π as given. It can directly be observed that the corresponding lines of partial optima do not have an intersection. Consequently, there does not exists a globally optimal choice of Taylor rule parameters when both coefficients are variable. Since the loss decreases in both coefficients [cf. Figure 3] , the minimal loss is obtained in the limit case k π → ∞ and k x → ∞. In Figure 4 , this fact is indicated with a black arrow.
All in all, the unsatisfactory feature that there exists a multiplicity of stable monetary policy rules remains [see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) ]. However, Taylor rule coefficients resulting in N = 0 can be improved when moving into the stable area which contrasts with Barro and Gordon (1983a) . Moreover, there exists no globally optimal stable Taylor rule.
Extensions
For checking the robustness of the previous results, we will now turn to a monetary authority which is also concerned about stabilizing the interest rate as in Svensson (2000) . The extended social loss function then looks as follows
with λ > γ > 0. Although (30) cannot be derived from the household's utility function in the canonical New Keynesian framework, Kobayashi (2008) and Teranishi (2008) show that in a framework where the financial sector has a non-trivial role, the social loss function should include a positive weight on a financial variable. We set γ to 0.05.
The proceeding for obtaining the social loss for the different policy designs is equivalent to that in the previous sections. Under our standard calibration including z = 0.04, the standard Taylor rule however remains stable when extending the social loss function. In contrast to the case γ = 0, a Taylor rule with k x = 0 may be time-consistent if the Taylor rule coefficient on inflation is rather small.
Simultaneous Supply and Demand Shocks
As already mentioned and as shown in the Appendix, the demand shock can be interpreted as a shock to aggregate technology which is typically assumed to be expansionary (ψ > 0). In our notation this implies ε 1 < 0 since a technology shock causes the natural level, y * , to increase more than the current one, y, leading to a decline in the output gap,
It is a well-known that a pure demand shock can be totally compensated by discretionary monetary policy in the case γ = 0. This can be directly observed from the IS curve (1). 17 Hence, we will analyze simultaneous supply and demand shocks in the following. For the sake of simplicity, we will also normalize the impact of the demand shock to one, i.e. ε 1 = −1.
Then, the numerical evaluation of the different policy regimes yields
implying a critical subjective discount factor equal to 2.5020. Hence, the standard Taylor rule still remains stable when additionally considering an technological innovation. Figure 6 shows the net gain resulting from a deviation from the announced Taylor rule for a continuum of k π /k x -combinations. The continuum of stable Taylor rules now becomes smaller when considering the contractionary demand shock [cf. Figure   5 ]. 18 The rationale is that the social loss under the commitment strategy increases relative to those under inconsistent and discretionary policy. Consequently, the cost resulting from the loss in the central bank's reputation declines leading to an increasing incentive to switch over to inconsistent policy. 
Conclusion
We implement the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach in a static approximation of the canonical New Keynesian model. Within this framework, we are able to discuss both the commitment vs. discretion debate of the New Keynesian literature and the time-inconsistency problem of Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) 
Appendix
A Derivation of the demand shock Firms need only one input factor, labor which is denoted by N . The production function is then simply given by
where Y is output and Ψ represents a shock to aggregate productivity. Since b+bη 1+bη > 0, a shock to aggregate technology can thus be interpreted as a contractionary demand shock. The rationale is that the natural level increases more to an expansionary shock to productivity than the distorted actual output level such that the difference -the output gap -decreases.
B Social Losses with γ > 0 and ε 1 = 0 and ε 2 = 0
The modified loss function now contains an additional term concerning nominal interest rate stabilization.
B.1 Simple rule
The proceeding for deriving the social loss is equivalent to that in the main text.
Since we analyze calibrated instead of optimal simple rules, private expectations are thus not altered by the modified loss function and still follow (16)
When combining (16) and the Phillips curve (2), we obtain the solution path of the output gap and the inflation rate.
The additional demand shock causes an upward-pressure on both inflation and the output gap.
Finally, we need the solution for the nominal interest rate. Therefore, we insert
